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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to generate new theoretical and empirical insights into the way states and 
policies shape migration processes in their interaction with other migration determinants 
in receiving and sending countries. More fundamentally, this state of-the-art reveals a still 
limited understanding of the forces driving migration. Although there is consensus that 
macro-contextual economic and political factors and meso-level factors such as networks 
all play ‘some’ role, there is no agreement on their relative weight and mutual interaction. 
To start filling that gap, this paper outlines the contours of a conceptual framework for 
generating improved insights into the ways states and policies shape migration processes 
in their interaction with structural migration determinants in receiving and sending 
countries. First, it argues that the fragmented insights from different disciplinary theories 
can be integrated in one framework through conceptualizing virtually all forms of 
migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations. Second, to increase conceptual 
clarity it distinguishes the preponderant role of states in migration processes from the 
hypothetically more marginal role of specific immigration and emigration policies. 
Subsequently, it hypothesizes four different ‘substitution effects’ which can partly explain 
why polices fail to meet their objectives. This framework will serve as a conceptual guide 
for the determinants of international migration research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines the scientific 
rationale of this project by analysing the main 
gaps in migration policy and migration 
determinants research. It outlines the 
contours of a conceptual framework and a set 
of hypotheses for generating improved 
insights into the ways states and policies 
shape migration processes in their interaction 
with structural migration determinants in 
receiving and sending countries, which will 
guide the determinants of international 
migration project. In wealthy countries, 
immigration, in particular of low-skilled and 
culturally distinct people from poorer 
countries, is increasingly perceived as a 
problem in need of control. The common – 
but not unproblematic – perception is that 
policy-makers have reacted to this pressure 
by implementing restrictive immigration 
policies and increasing border controls 
(Massey et al. 1998).  
However, the effectiveness of such 
policies has been often contested in the face 
of their oft-supposed failure to significantly 
affect the level of immigration and their 
hypothesized unintended, perverse and often 
counterproductive effects such as pushing 
migrants into permanent settlement, 
discouraging return and encouraging 
irregular movements and migration through 
alternative legal or geographical channels 
(Castles 2004b; Grütters 2003). However, 
other scholars have argued that, on the whole, 
state policies have been largely effective 
(Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Strikwerda 
1999), which also seems to be partly 
confirmed by a limited number of 
quantitative studies indicating that specific 
policy interventions can have a significant 
effect on migration flows.  
Despite apparently increasing 
immigration restrictions, the volume of 
South–North migration has only increased 
over the past few decades. But does this mean 
that migration policies have failed and that 
states are generally unable to control 
migration? Not necessarily. First of all, we 
should not confuse statistical association with 
causality, which is particularly difficult to 
establish because we generally lack 
counterfactual cases. For instance, one might 
argue that the migration-reducing effects of 
immigration restrictions are counterbalanced 
by the migration-increasing effects of 
growing economic gaps between sending and 
receiving countries or economic growth in 
receiving countries, or the lifting of exit 
restrictions by origin countries.  
Hence, sustained or increasing migration 
does not necessarily prove policy 
ineffectiveness – as migration volumes might 
have been higher without migration controls. 
The other way around, a decrease in 
migration does not prove the policy 
successful – although politicians are 
generally eager to make such claims – as such 
a decrease might for instance also be the 
result of economic growth or an end of 
conflict in origin countries, or an economic 
recession in destination countries. So, finding 
better methodological approaches to 
establish (multiple) causality constitutes the 
first challenge facing research on this issue. 
Besides the huge difficulties involved in 
‘proving’ causality as such, a second 
challenge is to bring more precision in 
research by assessing the relative importance 
of immigration policies compared to the 
effects of other migration determinants. After 
all, it can hardly be surprising that most 
policies discouraging or encouraging 
particular manifestations of migration will 
 
 
have ‘some’ effect. The real question is about 
the relative magnitude of this effect 
compared to macro-contextual migration 
determinants, which will eventually also 
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of 
policies. Although some studies assert a 
statistical relation between certain policy 
measures and particular migration flows, the 
relative importance of policy effects 
compared to the effects of other migration 
determinants remains largely unclear.  
It is one thing to find that restrictions on, 
say, lows killed labour migration have a 
significant effect on decreasing inflows, but 
the real question is how large this effect is 
compared to the effect of other factors such 
as economic growth, employment, violent 
political conflict and personal freedoms. If 
the latter factors explain most variance in 
migration, one might for instance conclude 
that policies have a certain, but also limited 
effect on overall volumes and trends of 
migration. In other words, if most variance in 
migration is explained by structural 
migration determinants or other policies, the 
margin of manoeuvre for migration policies 
is fundamentally limited. 
In addition to finding better ways to 
measure the existence and relative magnitude 
of policy effects, a third, related, challenge is 
to improve insights into the very nature and 
evolution of migration policies. There seems 
to be reason to question the general assertion 
that migration policies have become more 
restrictive over the past decades. Although 
this idea is often taken for granted, the 
diverse and multiple nature of migration 
policies raises questions about our ability and 
utility to measure ‘overall’ levels of 
restrictiveness, and even about the overall 
assumption that policies have become more 
restrictive.  
While several countries have raised 
barriers for particular categories of migrants 
(for instance, low-skilled workers and 
asylum seekers), not all countries have done 
so, and immigration of other categories has 
often been facilitated. Changes in migration 
policy typically facilitate the entry of 
particular origin groups while simultaneously 
restricting the entry of other groups. For 
instance, ‘Fortress Europe’ may be an 
adequate metaphor to characterize policies 
towards asylum seekers and refugees (Hatton 
2004), but seems inappropriate to 
characterize the immigration policies of EU 
or OECD countries as a whole. 
Another example is the US Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965, which 
‘equalized’ immigration policies by ending 
positive discrimination of European 
immigrants and contributing to increasing 
non-European migration. This also reveals 
the strong Eurocentric bias underlying 
common views that migration to the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand was 
largely ‘free’ until at least the mid twentieth 
century (Hatton & Williamson 1998) – it may 
have been relatively free for Europeans, but 
this was certainly not the case for Asians or 
Africans, for whom recent reforms have 
meant a liberalization. Also countries’ 
membership and accession to regional blocks 
such as the European Union typically 
coincides with liberalization of migration of 
citizens of member states, while immigration 
restrictions for ‘third-country’ nationals are 
sustained or further tightened (Mannan & 
Krueger 1996).  
Because migration policies typically 
consist of a ‘mixed bag’ of various measures 
targeting particular groups of immigrants, 
there is a considerable risk of over-
generalizing. While migration policies are 
 
 
likely to affect patterns of migration 
selectivity, the impact on the overall 
magnitude of migration flows is more 
uncertain as these are strongly affected by 
other macro-structural factors, while 
migrants’ agency and strategies tend to create 
meso-level structures which facilitate 
migration over formally closed borders. 
Since state policies simultaneously constrain 
or enable immigration and emigration of 
particular groups along particular 
geographical pathways, states perhaps play a 
more significant role in structuring 
emigration through influencing the (initial) 
composition and spatial patterns of 
migration, rather than in affecting overall 
volumes and long-term trends, which, 
particularly in liberal democracies, appear to 
be primarily affected by other, economic, 
social and cultural migration determinants 
(Mannan & Krueger 1998). 
These examples show that any serious 
inquiry into the effect of migration policies 
not only needs to define the concept, but also 
to ‘unpack’ or disaggregate ‘migration 
policies’ into the multitude of laws, measures 
and regulations states deploy in their attempts 
to regulate immigration and emigration along 
categories that are based on national origin 
and further characteristics such as gender, 
age, education, occupation and officially 
defined main migration motives. As 
migration policies are typically affected and 
shaped by different, often opposed, interests, 
policies are typically internally incoherent, 
which further emphasizes the need to break 
down policies into the specific measures and 
regulations they comprise. 
In addition, conventional views of 
increasing migration policy restrictiveness 
typically ignore emigration policies pursued 
by origin states, which are as diverse and 
multiple as immigration policies, but which 
seem to have become less restrictive overall. 
Only a declining number of strong, 
authoritarian states with closed economies 
are willing and capable of imposing blanket 
exit restrictions. Paradoxically, while an 
increasing number of, particularly 
developing, countries seem to aspire to 
regulate emigration, their capability to do so 
is fundamentally and increasingly limited by 
legal (human rights), economic and political 
constraints. The ability of governments to 
affect overall immigration and emigration 
levels seems to decrease as the level of 
authoritarianism goes down. This also 
reveals the need to look beyond the role of 
migration policies per se and to explore the 
ways in which states affect the migration 
process more generally. 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
So, the crucial question remains: how do 
states and policies shape migration processes 
independently of and in their interaction with 
other migration determinants in receiving and 
sending countries? Due to serious 
methodological and theoretical flaws, 
scholarly research has so far hardly been able 
to produce convincing answers to these 
questions, and the second and third questions 
in particular. The inconclusive nature of this 
debate reveals an overall lack of conceptual, 
analytical and empirical rigour in the study of 
migration policy effects. Most existing 
evidence is descriptive, biased and partial, 
which is related to the weak embedding of 
migration policies research into general 
theories on the causes of migration. 
In this context, it is important to 
emphasize that the limited of capacity of 
research to answer these key questions is not 
exclusively linked to limitations of data and 
 
 
statistical models, but also to the rather weak 
theoretical foundations of ‘push-pull’ or 
gravity models which are routinely, but 
uncritically, used for studying migration 
determinants. For the very reason that they 
are often not grounded in migration theory, 
they tend to ignore or fail to properly specify 
several theoretically important migration 
determinants in receiving and, particularly, 
sending countries. Even with ideal data, 
statistical analyses will not lead to 
compelling evidence if theoretically relevant 
migration determinants are omitted in 
empirical models, or if models are based on 
the short term or only focus on one particular 
migration flow. This makes it impossible to 
study possible knock-on effects or what I 
have dubbed ‘substitution effects’ of one 
particular measure through the diversion of 
migration flows to other geographical, legal 
or illegal channels. 
In order to improve insights into the role 
of states and policies in migration processes, 
there is a need to embed the systematic 
analysis of policy effects into a 
comprehensive analytical framework of the 
sending- and receiving-country factors 
driving international migration. Although 
there is consensus that macro-contextual 
economic and political factors and meso-
level factors such as networks all play ‘some’ 
role, there is no agreement on their relative 
weight and mutual interaction. How do 
migration policies precisely affect migration 
if we control for the many other factors that 
drive international migration? Or, to turn the 
question around: how do macro-level 
processes such as ‘development’, economic 
growth, demographic change, education, 
democratization and conflict in origin and 
destination countries affect migration 
independently from policy interventions? In 
other words, what are the constraints and 
relative margins within which migration 
policies can have an effect? 
Why has research on this issue hardly 
advanced over the past decades? A first 
problem is the rather weak connection 
between studies on migration policies and 
migration determinants on the one hand and 
fundamental research and theories on the 
causes of migration on the other. A second 
problem is that fundamental theoretical 
research on the nature and causes of 
migration processes has made relatively little 
progress over the last few decades (Arango 
2000; Massey et al. 1998). There is a plethora 
of research on the social, cultural and 
economic impacts of migration on sending 
and, particularly, receiving societies.  
In comparison, and with the possible 
exception of research on migration networks, 
there has been much less theoretically driven 
research on the nature and causes of 
migration processes themselves. This 
particularly applies to the study of the precise 
role of policies and states in migration 
processes. Other factors obstructing advances 
in research on migration determinants are 
data problems and unproductive divisions 
between, particularly economic and non-
economic, social science disciplines as well 
as qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
To start filling these research gaps, in 
this paper I aim to outline the contours of a 
theoretical and empirical research agenda for 
generating improved insights into the ways 
states and policies shape migration processes 
independently from and in their interaction 
with other migration determinants in 
receiving and sending countries. First, I will 
review existing, often disciplinary, theories 
on migration and I will argue how their 
fragmented insights can be integrated in one 
 
 
framework through conceptualizing virtually 
all manifestations of migration as a function 
of capabilities and aspirations to migrate. 
Second, I will argue that considerable 
conceptual confusion can be removed if we 
distinguish the preponderant role of states in 
migration processes from the hypothetically 
more marginal role of specific immigration 
and emigration policies. Subsequently, based 
on a brief theorization of the role of states and 
policies in migration I will hypothesize four 
different ‘substitution effects’ explaining 
migration policy failure, which can guide 
further research on migration determinants 
within and outside the context of the 
determinants of international migration 
project. 
2.1 THEORIES OF MIGRATION 
The preceding analysis has indicated that 
a robust analysis of the role of states and 
policies in migration processes is conditional 
on its sound embedding within a more 
general theoretical framework on the 
determinants of migration processes. 
Although there is a quantitative, generally 
econometrically oriented literature on 
migration determinants including some 
studies on the effect of policies, the literature 
is generally characterized by a conspicuous 
ignorance of insights from recent migration 
theories. Hence, migration determinants 
research is generally based on obsolete, 
theoretically void ‘push-pull’ and gravity 
models. 
Implicitly or explicitly, gravity and 
push-pull models are rooted into functionalist 
social theory. Functionalist social theory 
tends to see society as a system – or an 
aggregate of interdependent parts, with a 
tendency towards equilibrium. This 
perspective, in which people are expected to 
move from low-income to high-income 
areas, has remained dominant in migration 
studies since Ravenstein (1885; 1889) 
formulated his laws of migration. The idea 
that migration is a function of spatial 
disequilibria constitutes the cornerstone 
assumption of so-called ‘push-pull’ models 
which still dominate much gravitybased 
migration modelling as well as common-
sensical and non-specialist academic 
thinking about migration.  
Push-pull models usually identify 
various economic, environmental, and 
demographic factors which are assumed to 
push migrants out of places of origin and lure 
them into destination places. While deeply 
rooted in functionalist, equilibrium thinking, 
it is difficult to classify push-pull models a 
theory because they tend merely to specify a 
rather ambiguous list of factors that play ‘a’ 
role in migration. Push-pull models tend to be 
static and tend to portray migrants as ‘passive 
pawns’ lacking any agency which can 
perhaps be defined as the ability of people to 
make independent choices – to act or not act 
in specific ways – and, crucially, to alter 
structure and fail to conceptualize migration 
as a process. 
Neo-classical migration theory is the 
best known and most sophisticated 
application of the functionalist social 
scientific paradigm in migration studies. At 
the macro-level, neoclassical economic 
theory explains migration by geographical 
differences in the supply and demand for 
labour. At the micro-level, neo-classical 
migration theory views migrants as 
individual, rational and income-maximizing 
actors, who decide to move on the basis of a 
cost-benefit calculation. Assuming free 
choice and full access to information, they are 
expected to go where they can be the most 
 
 
productive, that is, where they are able to earn 
the highest wages. Todaro (1969) and Harris 
and Todaro (1970) elaborated the basic 
twosector model of rural-to-urban migration, 
explaining migration on the basis of 
‘expected income’ differentials. The initial 
Harris Todaro model for internal migration 
has, with some modifications, also been 
applied to international migration (Borjas 
1989; Borjas 1990). Later modifications of 
the neo-classical model included the costs 
and risks of migration, and conceptualized 
migration as an investment in human capital 
in order to explain migration selectivity 
(Bauer & Zimmermann 1998; Sjaastad 
1962). 
Neo-classical and other equilibrium 
migration models largely explain migration 
by geographical differences in incomes and 
wage levels (Harris and Todaro 1970; Lee 
1966; Todaro 1969). Although it would be 
hard to deny that economic differentials play 
a major role in driving migration processes, 
this almost sounds more like a truism or 
assumption than a theory. Furthermore, this 
basic insight alone is insufficient to explain 
the strongly patterned, non-random nature of 
real-life migration processes. For instance, 
these models have difficulties explaining 
return migration, migration in the absence of 
wage differentials and, particularly, 
adequately grasping the role of states, 
networks and other institutions in structuring 
migration. They also largely ignore non-
economic migration drivers and typically fail 
to explain development-driven increases in 
migration. 
2.2 NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY 
Other theories of migration reject the 
underlying functionalist assumption of 
conventional neo-classical models that 
migration decisions are based on the rational 
cost-benefit calculation of income-
maximizing individuals operating in well-
functioning markets. The new economics of 
labour migration (NELM) hypothesizes that 
migration, particularly under conditions of 
poverty and risk, is difficult to explain within 
a neo-classical framework. NELM 
conceptualizes migration as a collective 
household strategy to overcome market 
failures and spread income risks rather than a 
mere response of income-maximizing 
individuals to expected wage differentials 
(Stark 1991; Stark & Bloom 1985; Taylor 
1999). This gives considerable theoretical 
room to explain migration in the absence of 
significant wage differentials. NELM also 
argues that income inequality and relative 
deprivation within sending societies are 
major drivers of migration (Skeldon 2002; 
Stark & Taylor 1989). Through remittances, 
migration can also be a livelihood strategy 
used by families and households to raise 
investment capital if credit markets fail. 
Within a broader social scientific 
perspective, it is possible to reinterpret 
NELM as a theory that explains migration as 
an active attempt – an act of agency – by 
social groups to overcome structural 
constraints. An important methodological 
inference of these ‘new’ theories is that 
market access, income inequality, relative 
deprivation, and social security are important 
migration determinants, and need to be 
included in empirical models if possible. 
NELM-inspired migration theory seems 
particularly relevant for explaining migration 
in developing countries and other situations 
in which migrants face considerable 
constraint and risk, and therefore also seems 
applicable to ‘non-labour’ forms of 
migration, such as refugee migration. This 
points to a more general weakness of 
 
 
conventional ways of classifying migration 
into distinct types and the concomitant 
tendency to develop separate theories for 
them. This is deeply problematic, as these 
migration types reflect legal rather than 
sociological categories. These 
categorizations ignore empirical evidence 
that migration is typically driven by a range 
of contextual factors and that individual 
motivations to migrate are often mixed 
(Mannan & Krueger 2002).. This makes strict 
distinctions such as between voluntary and 
forced migration, or between family and 
labour migration, often deeply problematic. 
This seems certainly to be the case in the 
context of restrictive immigration policies, in 
which prospective migrants perceived 
policies as opportunity structures within 
which the choice of migration channel is 
likely to be based on relative ease and costs 
rather than on a consideration of which 
category best matches their ‘genuine’ 
migration motives (Mannan & Kozlov 2001). 
While some would still classify NELM 
as an amended form of neo-classical theory, 
a more profound critique of neo-classical and 
push-pull migration theories would stress 
their a-historical nature and their failure to 
conceptualize how macro-structural factors 
such as states, policies, labour markets, status 
hierarchies, power inequalities and social 
group formation strongly constrain 
individual choice and explain why most 
migration tends to occur in socially selective 
and geographically strongly patterned ways; 
that is, along well-defined pathways or 
corridors between particular origins and 
destinations. Conventional economic models 
usually incorporate structural factors as 
additional costs and risks individuals face. It 
certainly does make sense to assume that 
structural constraints affect the cost-benefit 
calculus and destination choice. However, 
the reduction of such factors to individual 
costs and benefits makes such models 
inherently blind to the very structural features 
of such factors, which can only be analysed 
on the group level as they are embedded in 
and reproduced by patterns of relations 
between people. Despite the considerable 
merits of neo-classical approaches, their 
methodological individualism largely 
inhibits them from capturing structural 
factors. 
At a more fundamental level, 
functionalist social theory can been criticized 
for being unable to explain growing 
disequilibria, structural power inequalities, 
social contradictions and the role of conflict 
in social transformation; as well as for its 
inability to conceptualize structure and 
agency. In contrast, ‘conflict theory’, the 
social scientific opposite of 
functionalist/equilibrium theory, postulates 
that social and economic systems tend to 
reproduce and reinforce structural 
inequalities and serve the interests of the 
powers that be, and that they can only be 
altered through a radical change in power 
structures through the organized (structured) 
resistance of oppressed groups. In other 
words, social transformation does not often 
come smoothly, and often requires collective 
action enabled by rising consciousness about 
one’s perceived oppression and one’s ability 
to overcome such oppression by peaceful or 
violent resistance (Collins (1994)). 
Within the general social-scientific 
paradigm of ‘conflict theory’, Marxist, 
dependency, and world systems theory tend 
to see migration as the direct outflow of the 
spread of global capitalism and the related 
marginalization and uprooting of rural 
populations around the world who have no 
choice other than to migrate to cities to join 
 
 
the urban proletariat. Migration is therefore 
seen as a process that serves the interests of 
large corporations and specific economic 
interest groups and states that are strongly 
lobbied by these interests. These approaches 
can be criticized for being overly deductive 
and deterministic, with their concomitant 
portrayal of individuals as passive victims of 
economic macro-forces. In other words, 
individual migrants are hardly attributed any 
agency and, as far as they act, they are 
supposed to make irrational choices. 
In order to explain why people behave in 
ways that go against their own objective, 
material interests, Marxist theory uses the 
concept of false consciousness, which can be 
defined as the ‘failure to recognize the 
instruments of one's oppression or 
exploitation as one’s own creation, as when 
members of an oppressed class unwittingly 
adopt views of the oppressor class’. The 
assumption that all or most migrants behave 
irrationally seems equally unrealistic as the 
full rationality and income-maximizing 
assumptions of orthodox neo-classical 
models. For instance, it would be difficult to 
reason that the choices of refugees or 
unemployed graduates to emigrate are not 
rational to a considerable extent. 
Although few would still agree with the 
more orthodox versions of neo-Marxist 
theory in the face of ample empirical 
evidence pointing to the fact that poor people 
also exert a considerable amount of agency, 
it would also be naïve to deny that migration 
processes are to a significant extent 
determined by contextual factors, and that 
while individual choice is certainly not 
absent, it is considerably constrained by 
structural factors –facilitating migration of 
specific social groups along specific 
geographical and legal pathways while 
simultaneously impeding it for many others 
groups and along many other pathways. This 
seems particularly important for poor people 
with limited access to resources and markets 
and living in politically repressive 
environments. 
A powerful example of ‘structure’ – 
among several others – that appears to be 
particularly crucial as a migration 
determinant is the segmentation of labour 
markets. Dual labour market theory (Piore 
1979) argued that international migration is 
mainly driven by pull factors, since the 
segmentation of labour markets creates a 
permanent demand for cheap immigrant 
labour at the bottom, ‘secondary’ end of the 
labour market to occupy jobs that ‘primary’ 
workers typically shun, primarily because of 
social status and relative deprivation motives. 
The latter exemplifies the deep socio-cultural 
roots of what superficially appears to be ‘just’ 
an economic phenomenon (Mannan & 
Kozlov 1995). Although this is a partial 
theory, that ignores sending-side 
explanations altogether and implicitly 
assumes a quasi-unlimited supply of migrant 
workers, its core argument is very powerful 
to explain the remarkable persistence of low-
skilled migration to wealthy countries over 
the past half century as well as the 
coexistence of domestic unemployment and 
immigration: the demand for low-skilled 
migrants is sector-specific and has become 
structurally embedded in labour market 
structures and socio-cultural hierarchies. 
In this context, Stephen Castles (2002) 
has argued that ‘it is one of the great fictions 
of our age that the “new economy” does not 
need “-D workers” any more’. He argued that 
industrialized counties continue to import 
unskilled labor, and that – in the absence of 
sufficient legal channels for low-skilled 
 
 
labour migration – this often takes the form 
of systematic use of irregular migrants or 
asylum seekers, whose very lack of rights 
makes them easy to exploit. Although the 
industries and mines in which low-skilled 
migrants worked have declined since the 
early 1970s, Saskia Sassen (1988) has argued 
that new internal and international divisions 
of labour have arisen, particularly in ‘global 
cities’, where the luxury consumption needs 
of the high-skilled have created new labour 
market demand, particularly in the lower 
skilled services, such as cleaning, childcare, 
restaurant work, gardening, but also in 
garment manufacture, construction, garment 
manufacture and food processing (Castles 
2002). 
Further elaborating upon the work by 
Piore, Castles, Sassen and others, it is 
possible to theorize that, over development 
processes, labour markets have grown 
increasingly complex and multi-segmented 
while the general level and degree of 
specialization in education has increased. As 
the geographical expanse of labour markets 
typically increases as education goes up, 
increasing levels and complexity of 
education and labour markets seems to drive 
people to migrate in order to match supply 
and demand. This seems to be one of the main 
reasons why relatively wealthy and 
developed societies are inherently more 
mobile and migratory than relatively poor 
societies. 
Studying and comparing the structure of 
labour markets as well as concomitant 
differences in income inequalities and 
relative deprivation can also help us to further 
understand the occurrence of significant 
migration between regions or countries with 
similar average income levels. However, 
these hypotheses have remained largely 
untested. The methodological inference of 
these theoretical insights is that, in order to 
advance our understanding of the structural 
drivers of migration processes, there is a need 
to develop empirical approaches to assess the 
interrelated roles of labour market structure, 
education and skill structure, social 
fractionalization and relative deprivation in 
affecting the volume and, particularly, the 
social composition and the geographical 
patterning of migration flows. 
This example of labour markets 
exemplifies that, in order to explain real-
world migration patterns, there is a need to go 
beyond gravity or push-pull approaches by 
looking beyond the level of ‘national 
averages’ such as GDP per capita and 
exploring the internal structure of societies 
and economies. This can partly be achieved 
through quantitative approaches, particularly 
through developing new indicators that 
capture key structural features such as 
inequality, relative deprivation (Stark 
&Taylor 1991), social security, and labour 
market structure. It goes without saying that 
all these factors are deeply affected by 
policies pursued by states. 
2.3 LABOUR MARKET APPROACH 
The weakness of labour market-based 
migration theories is that they focus on 
receiving country demand factors, and 
generally ignore how origin-country factors 
such as labour market structure, income 
levels and inequalities, social security, 
conflict, states and public policies, affect 
migration. At best, labour market-focused 
migration theories assume a quasi-unlimited 
supply of migrant labour, which seems to be 
implicitly based on the naïve notion that high 
population growth, poverty and warfare in 
developing countries ‘push’ migrants to 
 
 
leave, thereby virtually reducing their agency 
to zero. This notion clearly conflicts with 
empirical and theoretical insights on the 
intrinsic relationship between migration and 
broader processes of development and social 
transformation (Hatton & Williamson 1998; 
Massey 1991; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971). 
The latter insights question the ‘unlimited 
supply hypothesis’ and reveal a much more 
complex picture of how development 
processes affect migration and crucially 
undermine the assumptions underpinning 
conventional migration theories. 
For instance, conventional ideas that 
development in origin countries will reduce 
international migration are ultimately based 
on the assumption of ‘push-pull’ and 
‘gravity’ models that there is an inversely 
proportional relationship between absolute 
levels and relative differences of wealth on 
the one hand and migration on the other. By 
contrast, another group of theories postulate 
that development leads to generally increased 
levels of immigration and emigration. 
‘Migration transition theory’ hypothesizes 
that constraints-loosening and aspirations-
increasing economic and human 
development and parallel demographic 
transitions tend to have an inverted J-curve or 
U-curve effect on emigration rates (Mannan 
& Kozlov 1997). This hypothesized non-
linearity and the complexity of development 
migration linkages contrast with 
conventional theories and also compel us to 
design different, theoretically informed 
empirical approaches away from standard 
‘push-pull’ and gravity models. 
More in general, the receiving-country 
bias of migration research points to the 
importance of advancing our theoretical 
understanding of the origin-country 
determinants of migration processes at 
different levels of aggregation. Social 
security and welfare spending is another 
example of a potentially crucial origin-
country migration determinant. While there 
are several studies on the contested and 
questionable existence of a ‘welfare magnet’ 
effect on migration, this discussion is 
conspicuously biased towards destination 
states or countries, while there is reason to 
believe that factors such as social security 
matter equally if not more from an origin-
society perspective. More generally, this 
example also shows the need to fully take into 
account the role of structural and institutional 
factors in origin societies in shaping 
migration processes. 
2.4 DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION 
Conventional migration theories focus 
on how income and wage levels and, to a 
lesser extent, income inequalities affect 
migration processes. Although they might 
differ in their specification, they share a focus 
on economic differentials as the main driver 
of migration. This coincides with a research 
focus on labour migration and near-total 
separation from research on ‘forced’ or 
refugee migration. The implicit suggestion is 
that these different migration categories 
represent fundamentally different processes. 
There are many reasons to contest this view. 
After all, labels such as ‘labour’, ‘refugee’, 
‘family’ or ‘student’ migration primarily 
reflect legal categories, which are useful for 
administrative procedures, but are not very 
meaningful categories to help understand 
migration as a social process. For instance, 
the ‘voluntary’/‘forced’ migration dichotomy 
is simplistic because it assumes that one 
category of migrants enjoys total freedom 
and the other category has no choice or 
agency at all. 
 
 
The legal-bureaucratic categories 
frequently used in social scientific research 
conceal the fact that, on a macro-level, 
migration processes are driven by a multitude 
of economic and non-economic factors and 
that, on a micro-level, migrants are motivated 
by a combination of multiple, interconnected 
but analytically distinct social, cultural, 
economic and political factors. For instance, 
economic development is positively 
associated with democratization processes 
(Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994), and 
economic development and democratization 
are likely to affect migration processes 
simultaneously. It would be naïve to assume 
that refugees are also affected by economic 
and social considerations, certainly where 
destination choice is concerned. Likewise, 
‘labour migrants’ are likely also to weigh 
personal freedoms in their migration 
decision-making. And ‘family migrants’ are 
potential workers too. 
These few examples also show the need 
to look beyond specific policies, and to 
consider the nature of states. For instance, the 
position of states both on the 
authoritarianism-democracy and on the 
strong-weak central power continuums 
seems to be an important macro-structural 
determinant of migration processes, as both 
positions affect aspirations and capabilities to 
migrate and the extent to which states will 
desire and be able to ‘steer’ migration. There 
is also a clear need to differentiate between 
different types of freedoms as they are likely 
to affect migration in different ways. 
3.1 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
The main challenge for advancing 
migration theory is how to synthesize the 
different migration theories developed across 
a range of social science disciplines – ranging 
from economics to anthropology. Faced with 
the daunting complexity and diversity of 
migration processes, migration scholars have 
often – and perhaps wearingly – argued that 
an all-encompassing and all-explaining 
theory of migration will never arise (Salt 
1987; Van Amersfoort 1998). Unfortunately, 
this probably sensible observation has 
coincided with a strong tendency to abandon 
theorizing migration altogether. Although 
migration is certainly a complex and 
apparently ‘messy’ process, this goes for 
virtually all social processes. Moreover, 
migration may be complex, but it is certainly 
not a random process. Instead, it is a strongly 
socially structured and spatially patterned 
process, in which strong regularities can be 
discerned. 
More generally, ‘all-
comprehensiveness’ is not what social theory 
should be about in the first place. Social 
theory formation is precisely about striking a 
delicate balance between the desire to 
acknowledge the intricate complexities and 
the richness of social life on the one hand and 
the scientific need to discern underlying 
regularities, patterns and trends on the other. 
Theory formation is exactly about 
generalizing, which is a reductionist process 
by definition, where the exception may well 
prove the rule. Although it is indeed naïve to 
assume that a one-size-fits-all theory 
explaining migration at all places and at all 
times will ever arise, there is undoubtedly 
more room for theorizing on migration 
processes and how they reciprocally connect 
to broader processes of social and economic 
change. 
Much can already be gained from 
developing a more unified social-scientific 
perspective on migration, in which 
unproductive disciplinary boundaries are 
 
 
broken down. In their seminal review of 
migration theories, Massey et al. (1993) 
rightly argued that the different theories on 
migration are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Because different disciplines use 
different jargons and methodological tools, 
they often seem irreconcilable, but below the 
surface they often study similar processes 
and causal links. Once conceptual confusion 
is resolved by debate, and sufficient openness 
is created to learn from other methodological 
approaches, a lot of the apparent 
contradictions turn out to be rather spurious, 
and cross-fertilization can enrich theoretical 
thinking. For instance, the new economics of 
labour migration (NELM), which is one of 
the major past advances in economic 
migration theory, was apparently inspired by 
research on household composition and 
livelihood strategies conducted by 
anthropologists and sociologists (Lucas & 
Stark 1985). Although there are marked 
differences between different theories, 
disciplines and associated research traditions, 
they are not necessarily incompatible, and 
there is considerable room to identify more 
common grounds and to create conceptual 
bridges. 
However, an eclectic ‘combining of 
insights’ cannot solve some more 
fundamental problems, particularly when 
theories have different paradigmatic roots. 
For instance, it seems impossible to merge 
neo-classical and neo-Marxist migration 
theories, because they differ in their most 
fundamental assumptions. For similar 
reasons, theoretical problems cannot be 
solved by simply ‘plugging in’ variables 
‘representing’ the different theories in the 
same regression equation, as is often the 
tendency. What is really lacking, and what is 
hindering theoretical synthesis, is a more 
comprehensive and convincing ‘behavioural’ 
framework of migration than the current 
theories offer. The only systematically 
elaborated micro-behavioural model of 
migration is neo-classical. Although neo-
classical migration theory has been much 
reviled for a number of more and less 
convincing reasons, no credible alternative 
has been proposed so far. 
Despite the enormous value of macro-
level theories developed by sociologists, 
geographers and demographers, because of 
their very macro-level nature they often lack 
a ‘behavioural link’ to the micro-level. In 
other words, they do not make explicit the 
behavioural assumptions underpinning the 
macro-level correlations they assume or 
describe. It would be to commit a classical 
‘ecological fallacy’ to confound macro-level 
migration determinants with individual 
migration motives – which is exactly what 
the push-pull and non-expert literature on 
environmental change and migration 
typically does. After all, people do not 
migrate ‘because of’ abstract concepts such 
as demographic transitions, declining 
fertility, ageing, population density, 
environmental degradation or factor 
productivity. For instance, there may often be 
a correlation between demographic and 
migration transitions, but this does not make 
clear why people should necessarily migrate 
under conditions of high population growth. 
People will only migrate if they perceive 
better opportunities elsewhere and have the 
capabilities to move. Although this assertion 
implies choice and agency, it also shows that 
this agency is constrained by (historically 
determined) conditions which create concrete 
opportunity structures. 
Ultimately, in the social world, 
‘causality’ therefore runs through people’s 
agency, producing outcomes on the 
 
 
aggregate level which can perhaps be 
measured through macro indicators. But any 
convincing macro-model should be 
underpinned by a credible micro behavioural 
link. The lack of micro-behavioural 
foundation makes most macro-theories 
deterministic. In fact, the problem with the 
very term ‘determinants’ is that it conveys a 
somehow deterministic picture of ‘causation 
from outside’, independent from migrants’ 
agency and internal migration dynamics. It 
seems therefore desirable to (re)define the 
concept of ‘determinants’ so as to include 
human agency, which has independent power 
to change social structures (Mannan & 
Krueger 2000). 
Crucially, most macro-theories ignore 
agency. At the same time, neo-classical 
migration theory has a reductionist, 
mechanistic concept of agency. Hence, what 
we need is a new and more realistic micro-
level model or framework of migration. Such 
a framework should take into account 
empirical insights of decades of migration 
research from across a range of disciplines, 
but at the same time it should remain basic 
and parsimonious enough so as to fulfil its 
generalizing ambitions. Such a framework 
should specify the basic assumptions about 
the factors that make people decide to 
migrate (or not). Two further conditions need 
to be met: first, such a model should 
incorporate a sense of agency, and should not 
conceive migration as an almost 
‘mechanistic’ response to a range of ‘pushes’ 
or ‘pulls’, or wage differentials. Ultimately, 
this is also the reason why gravity models 
normally used for trade cannot be assumed to 
be valid to model human migration. People 
are not goods. Goods are passive. People are 
humans, who make active decisions based on 
their subjective aspirations and preferences, 
so their behaviour is not just a function of 
macrolevel disequilibria, neither does their 
behaviour necessarily decrease these 
disequilibria (Mannan & Kozlov 1999). 
Second, such a micro-model should 
incorporate a sense of structure, in the sense 
that migration behaviour is constrained by 
structurally determined resource and 
information limitations. 
This above analysis leads to the 
proposition that, in order to improve our 
insights into the factors driving migration, 
and to synthesize prior theories, an improved 
theoretical model of migration should: 
conceive migration aspirations as a function 
of spatial opportunity differentials and 
people’s life aspirations; and conceive 
migration propensities as a function of their 
aspirations and capabilities to migrate. These 
two basic assumptions about migration 
behaviour can serve as basic building blocks 
to build a theory of migration which 
synthesizes many existing theoretical and 
empirical insights. Although this still needs 
considerable theoretical elaboration in future 
work, such a conceptualization would allow 
us to: integrate economic and non-economic 
theories on migration and overcome 
‘migration category’-based theorizing; 
integrate theories on so-called ‘voluntary’ 
and ‘forced’ migration; link micro- to macro-
theories; and open new avenues for 
integrating agency and culture into migration 
theory. 
The conceptualization of migration as a 
function of opportunity rather than income or 
wage differentials compels us to study how 
social, economic and political conditions 
affect migration processes simultaneously. 
Improved empirical models should reflect 
this and would allow for the study of the 
relative importance of each of such factors as 
well as their mutual interaction. In an attempt 
 
 
to move beyond the artificial separation 
between economic and non-economic 
explanations, it seems useful to apply 
Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach 
to migration theory. In his book Development 
as Freedom, Sen (1999) defined development 
as the process of expanding the substantive 
freedoms that people enjoy. In order to 
operationalize these ‘freedoms’, he used the 
concept of human capability, which refers to 
the ability of human beings to lead lives they 
have reason to value, and to enhance the 
substantive choices they have (Sen 1997: 
1959). Sen stressed that freedom is central to 
the process of development primarily for its 
intrinsic, wellbeing-enhancing power, which 
has to be clearly distinguished from the 
instrumental effectiveness of freedoms of in 
contributing to economic progress, which 
have been the usual benchmark to ‘measure’ 
development. 
Within this capabilities perspective, this 
study conceive human mobility as an integral 
part of human development for both intrinsic 
and instrumental reasons. First, people can 
only move if they have the capabilities to do 
so. Human mobility can be defined as the 
capability to decide where to live – and 
migration is the associated functioning. 
Expansions in this capability are an 
expansion of the choices open to an 
individual and therefore of their freedom. 
This is the intrinsic argument why mobility 
can be an integral part of human 
development. At the same time, movement 
can enable people to improve other 
dimensions relevant to their capabilities such 
as their income, their health, the education of 
themselves and of their children, and their 
self-respect. This is the instrumental value of 
mobility for development.  
This is why it is important to distinguish 
between the capability to move and the act of 
movement. In fact, some manifestations of 
migration are a result of the choices and 
freedoms of individuals becoming more 
restricted. So, enhanced mobility is not only 
the freedom to move – it is also the freedom 
to stay in one’s preferred location. Having 
choice to stay or to go, and where to go, 
captures the very essence of agency. The 
application of a capabilities-focused 
conceptualization of development (Sen 1999) 
also creates conceptual room to fully include 
factors such as education, health, social 
security, various inequalities, and personal 
and political freedoms as migration 
determinants. It also creates room to broaden 
our view of freedom- and wellbeing-
generating resources to include not only 
economic, but also human and social 
resources or ‘capitals’. 
Another conceptual advantage of Sen’s 
perspective is that the notion of capabilities 
creates analytical room to start incorporating 
notions of agency in migration theory. The 
concept of agency is intrinsically linked to 
the power of social actors to affect processes 
of structural change. It is important to 
emphasize that agency can both sustain as 
well as alter processes and structural 
conditions (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). 
From this, migration itself can be 
conceptualized as a form, or expression of, 
agency, and not only a ‘functionalist’ 
response to spatial differentials in economic 
opportunity. However, the extent to which 
social actors can exert agency is dependent 
on structural conditions which determine the 
space of manoeuvre within which individuals 
can make independent choices. Within the 
capabilities framework, the act of migration 
itself can be wellbeing-enhancing for the 
intrinsic value of the migration experience. 
 
 
Crucially, this enables us to incorporate 
manifestations of migration and mobility, 
where the experience itself is an important 
motive for moving, and the improvement of 
material circumstances plays a relatively 
minor role. As with tourism, through 
discovering new horizons and acquainting 
oneself with other cultures, in particular for 
young people, migration can have an intrinsic 
wellbeing-enhancing dimension. 
As a next conceptual step, and drawing 
on Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) concepts of 
negative and positive liberty, we can 
conceptualize capabilities as a function of 
positive and negative freedoms. Within 
Berlin’s perspective, negative liberty means 
the absence of obstacles, barriers or 
constraints. This comes close to classical 
ways of conceiving freedom, which are 
particularly focused on the role of states and 
politics in imposing constraints on people’s 
freedom or even being an outright threat to 
people’s lives. This concept of liberty is also 
the basis for the United Nations Refugee 
Protection regime, and international human 
rights organizations. Within this perspective, 
democracy, conflict prevention and 
promoting the rule of law are typically seen 
as ways to promote people’s freedoms and to 
prevent ‘forced’ migration. 
Berlin’s (1969) concept of positive 
liberty refers to the possibility or the fact of 
acting in such a way as to take control of 
one’s life and realize one’s fundamental 
purposes. This concept pertains to the agency 
of individuals and groups to change their life 
circumstances and to escape from 
disadvantaged positions. It is enshrined in 
international human rights8 and notions of 
‘empowerment’ in development theory. 
Positive liberty embodies the notion that the 
absence of external constraint is not a 
sufficient condition for people to improve 
their wellbeing. This is a point that Amartya 
Sen has particularly stressed in his 
development theory. For instance, a given 
state might be formally democratic and there 
might be an absence of political persecutions, 
but illiterate and poor people generally lack 
the capabilities and resources to actually 
make use of such liberties. In other words, 
people need access to resources in the forms 
of social, human and material capital in order 
to exert their agency, such as the freedom to 
migrate or not to migrate. This reveals a 
fundamental paradox: although relative 
deprivation of freedoms and an awareness of 
better opportunities elsewhere may make 
people aspire to migrate, absolute deprivation 
of either negative or positive freedoms, or 
both, will prevent them from exerting such 
migratory agency. 
So, from a capabilities point of view, the 
very term ‘forced migration’ is somehow an 
oxymoron, as people still need capabilities to 
be able to migrate. While deprivation of 
negative freedoms is likely to motivate 
people to migrate, they need a certain level of 
empowerment or access to positive freedoms 
in order to actually be capable of fleeing 
towards a particular destination. When 
people are deprived of both freedoms, they 
are generally forced to stay where they are. In 
conflict situations, the most deprived are 
typically the ones who are ‘forced to stay’. 
The concept of negative freedom is also 
useful for theorizing the role of immigration 
and emigration policies. Restrictive 
immigration policies can decreases people’s 
‘negative freedoms’ to migrate, and can 
create situations of ‘involuntary immobility’, 
a term aptly coined by Carling (2002). Such 
involuntary immobility can also occur under 
restrictive emigration policies.  
 
 
However, even under liberal migration 
policies where people may enjoy abundant 
negative freedoms, if they are deprived of the 
basic positive freedoms and access to social, 
human and economic resources, they will still 
be unable to migrate, particularly over larger 
distances. All of this helps to explain the 
paradox of why development often coincides 
with increasing levels of migration. From 
this, the author hypothesize that most 
emigration is likely to occur when people 
enjoy a maximum of negative freedoms and 
a moderate level of positive freedoms, as very 
high levels of positive freedoms and 
declining spatial opportunity differentials 
would somehow decrease their aspirations to 
migrate. This also shows why so-called push-
pull theories are fundamentally flawed: with 
the exception of extreme situations like 
slavery, people are not goods that can be 
passively moved: they need to move by 
themselves, and a fundamental precondition 
for that to happen is that they have the 
willingness and capabilities to do so. 
This brings in the concept of aspirations, 
which is a crucial element of this attempt at 
theoretical synthesis and, particularly, the 
attempt to better incorporate agency in 
migration theory. Conventional migration 
theories either totally disregard or have very 
reductionist notions of agency. Although 
within neoclassical and other functionalist 
migration theories, there is room for 
individual decision-making, there is no 
genuine room for agency, because individual 
behaviour is a totally predictable, 
mechanistic outcome of wage and other 
opportunity differentials. The underlying 
assumptions are that people are free from 
constraints, enjoy full access to information, 
and make migration decisions with the aim of 
maximizing their utility. These are clearly 
unrealistic assumptions. Although 
mainstream economics and, to a certain 
extent, migration economics have come a 
long way to acknowledge information and 
market imperfections in their theories and 
models, the utility-maximizing notion 
underlying decision-making has not been 
fundamentally challenged. 
Here, it is important to observe that 
push-pull and gravity models as well as 
neoclassical and other functionalist migration 
theories implicitly assume that people’s 
preferences and, hence, aspirations are 
constant across societies and over time, and 
basically boil down to individual income 
maximization. In other words, people living 
in different societies, despite the huge 
variations in the amount and type of 
information and social, cultural and 
economic resources they can access, are 
somehow assumed to react in similar 
fashions to similar external stimuli or 
exogenously defined ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 
factors. This is what makes functionalist 
theory inherently mechanistic and their 
micro-models totally devoid of any real sense 
of agency, as individual choices are entirely 
predictable and human beings are, indeed, 
conceptualized to be ‘pulled’ and ‘pushed’ in 
space like atoms without their own will and 
ability to make independent choices and, 
herewith, affect structural change. 
Functionalist theory conceptualizes 
migration as an equilibrium- and system-
reinforcing process. It therefore leaves no 
analytical room for either structural 
inequalities embedded in social hierarchies or 
migrants exercising agency.  
The crucial problem is that functionalist 
migration theory assumes that overall 
preferences are more or less constant across 
societies and over time. This ignores the fact 
that culture, education and access and 
 
 
exposure to particular forms of information 
are likely to have a huge impact on people’s 
notions of the good life and, hence, personal 
life aspirations; and their awareness and 
perception of opportunities elsewhere. If 
people do not aspire to other lifestyles 
‘elsewhere’, even if they seem ‘objectively’ 
or ‘materially’ better, they will not translate 
this awareness into a desire to migrate. In 
fact, cultural ‘home preference’ seems to be 
a major explanation for why most people do 
not migrate. On the other hand, if migration-
as-an-experience is intrinsically seen as 
wellbeing-enhancing, people might even 
voluntary opt for ‘objectively’ less 
favourable circumstances. Nevertheless, it 
seems reasonable to hypothesize that, in 
general, people’s personal life aspirations 
and awareness of opportunities elsewhere 
increase when levels of education and access 
to information improve in processes that are 
usually conceived as ‘human development’. 
If this coincides with the occurrence of 
significant differences in structurally 
determined spatial opportunity differentials, 
this is more likely to generate aspirations to 
migrate in an attempt to fulfil these life 
aspirations.. 
Altogether, this yields a more 
comprehensive picture of behavioural causes 
of migration beyond the basic model of 
income-maximizing individuals reacting to 
wage differentials. Such an amended 
theoretical framework also helps us to re-
conceptualize migration as an intrinsic part of 
processes of human development rather than 
the ‘outcome’ of development failure or a 
function of income and wage differentials or 
other externally given ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 
factors. Conceiving migration as a function 
of capabilities and aspirations to migrate also 
gives us better, albeit certainly not perfect, 
conceptual tools to start incorporating 
meaningful notions of agency in theoretical 
models and empirical approaches. More in 
general, the simultaneous incorporation of 
agency and structure in migration theories 
remains one of the main challenges for 
advancing migration theory and, hence, the 
specification of more realistic empirical 
approaches.  
A key condition for incorporating 
structure and agency is to connect both 
concepts and to understand their dialectics. In 
this respect, ‘structure’ is often erroneously 
seen as a set of constraints, whereas in reality 
structures simultaneously constrain and 
facilitate agency. As we have seen, factors 
such as states and policies, economic and 
social inequalities as well as networks have a 
strong structuring effect on migration, which 
means that they are inclusive for some groups 
and exclusive for others, and that they 
strongly favour migration along certain 
geographical pathways while discouraging it 
along others. This typically leads to a rather 
neat social and geographical structuring and 
clustering of migration. 
So, the ensemble of structural conditions 
creates complex opportunity structures, 
endowing different individuals and social 
groups with different sets of negative and 
positive freedoms, which, depending on how 
these constellations affect their capabilities 
and aspirations, may or may not make them 
decide to migrate. In its turn, such agency 
will reciprocally affect these initial 
conditions through feedback effects, 
exemplifying the dialectics of structure and 
agency in migration processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS 
The challenge to link agency and 
structure is also related to the difficulties of 
linking micro level explanations of 
migration, which focus on how individual 
characteristics, access to resources, 
perceptions and preferences shape migration 
behaviour, to macro-level level theories 
which, ultimately, see migrants’ behaviour as 
a rather passive, and therefore rather 
predictable, outcome of given opportunity 
structures. In the literature it has been argued 
that meso-level theories on the formation of 
networks and migration systems provide this 
vital link (Faist 1997). The migration 
literature has identified various feedback 
mechanisms which explain why, once 
started, migration processes tend to become 
partly self-perpetuating, leading to the 
formation of migrant networks and migration 
systems (Mabogunje 1970; Massey 1990; 
Massey et al. 1998).  
Such feedback loops provide a powerful, 
concrete example of the dialectics between 
agency and structure, as they show how 
migrants create meso-level structures such as 
networks and the ‘migration industry’ 
(Castles 2004a) that have a knock-on effect 
in reinforcing migration between particular 
places and countries through counter-flows 
of ideas and information (Mabogunje 1970), 
as well as decreasing the costs and risks of 
migration (Massey et al. 1998), thereby 
actively defying structural constraints such as 
high travel costs and restrictive immigration 
policies. This is a prime example of how 
migrants exert agency and are able to change 
initial structural conditions in such a way that 
they further facilitate migration along 
particular pathways. It is also a prime 
explanation of why states often find it 
difficult to control once-started migration 
processes. These notions are crucial for 
theorizing the role of states and policies in 
migration processes. 
However, existing theories on these 
‘internal dynamics’ of migration processes 
are characterized by some fundamental 
weaknesses which I reviewed in another 
paper. First, the usual focus on migrant 
networks coincides with a neglect of other 
feedback dynamics that operate through the 
impact of migration on the sending and 
receiving contexts (Mannan & Krueger 
2004). Migration inevitably changes the 
initial structural conditions under which 
migration takes place in sending and 
receiving communities and societies, which, 
in their turn, reciprocally affect people’s 
aspirations and capabilities to migrate. 
Examples of such structural impacts include 
the impact of migration on income inequality 
and relative deprivation in origin societies, 
the migration-facilitating role of remittances, 
and the rise of immigrant-dominated 
entrepreneurial sectors in destination 
countries, as well as the segmentation of 
labour markets along ethnic lines (Mannan & 
Kozlov 2003). Such processes contribute to 
the formation of migration systems – a set of 
places or countries linked by flows and 
counterflows of people, goods, services, and 
information, which tend to facilitate further 
exchange, including migration, between the 
places (Mannan & Kozlov 2005; Fawcett 
1989; Kritz et al. 1992; Mabogunje 1970; 
Massey et al. 1998). 
Second, the largely circular logic of 
these theories reveals an inability to 
conceptualize which migration-undermining 
feedback mechanisms may counteract 
migration-facilitating feedback dynamics and 
which may explain the endogenous decline of 
established migration systems. Theoretically, 
 
 
this can be explained by applying insights 
from the critical social capital literature 
pioneered by Portes (1998) and, in particular, 
the notion of negative social capital, to 
migration theories. Migrants do not 
necessarily help each other, and strong social 
ties and networks can also exclude non-group 
members. One of the methodological lessons 
is that empirical models should not just 
assume that the strength of network effects is 
a function of the size of migrant 
communities, as recent quantitative work 
tends to do. The relative importance of 
networks in facilitating migration crucially 
depends on the relative dependence on social 
capital among migrant communities. 
Moreover, positive network effects tend to 
decline over time. 
3.3 THEORIZING  
If anything, the above analysis points to 
the preponderance of structural factors such 
as economic and human development, labour 
market structure, social stratification, income 
inequalities, relative deprivation and social 
security, and the role of negative freedoms as 
well as positive freedoms in the form of 
access to material, social and human capital 
in shaping people’s capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate. This compels us to ask 
the following crucial question: within this 
broader whole of big forces and structural 
factors, and migrants’ considerable agency to 
shape and consolidate migration pathways 
and networks, what role is still left for 
migration policies pursued by states? Is that a 
comparatively marginal one, or do policies 
still play a key role? 
There is no simple answer to that 
question, first of all because the role of states 
and policies seems to vary according to the 
nature of the states, and is also dependent on 
the phase of migration system formation. The 
answer also crucially depends on whether we 
refer to the role of states in general or the role 
of specific migration policies. However, 
based on this theoretical framework it is 
possible to elaborate a few hypotheses. These 
are based on the notion that migration 
policies primarily affect negative freedoms in 
the form of the right to leave or enter a 
national territory, but that, primarily through 
non-migration policies (such as economic 
and education), states also affect people’s 
positive freedoms. While these factors affect 
people’s capabilities to migrate, factors such 
as repression and poverty affect people’s 
aspirations to migrate. 
First, the power of states to influence 
immigration and, particularly, emigration is 
much higher for repressive, authoritarian and 
centralized states than for liberal, democratic 
and decentralized states, which need to take 
more account of democratic processes and 
fundamental human rights. Second, we can 
hypothesize that states and policies often play 
an important role in the initiation of 
international migration, whether in the form 
of recruitment, visa requirements, 
colonialism, military occupation, or political 
repression (Entzinger 1985; Massey et al. 
1998; Penninx 1982; Skeldon 1997). On the 
other hand, it is important to emphasize that 
this is not always the case and that certain 
policies, such as recruitment, can also be an 
attempt to formalize already existing flows. 
However, once a certain number of 
migrants have settled at the destination, 
migration can become partly self-
perpetuating (Castles 2004b; Massey 1990; 
Massey et al. 1998). The ‘internal dynamics’ 
of migration processes make additional 
movements more likely through various 
social, cultural and economic feedback 
 
 
mechanisms. According to migration systems 
theory (Mabogunje 1970), such mechanisms 
lead to almost organized migratory flows 
between particular regions and countries 
(Kritz et al. 1992; Portes & Böröcz 1987). In 
particular, migrant networks are believed to 
play a crucial role in facilitating continued 
migration over formally closed borders 
(Böcker 1994), which is a key example of 
how migrants’ agency and counter-strategies 
can actively undermine states’ attempts to 
control migration. 
Many migration scholars are therefore 
sceptical about the abilities of liberal 
democratic states to control migration. They 
argue that fluctuations in migration primarily 
respond to structural demand factors 
determined by human development, 
economic cycles, employment and changes 
in the structure of segmented labour markets; 
factors which largely lie beyond the reach of 
policy-makers. At the same time, migrant 
networks further facilitate migration along 
established pathways. Hence the assertion 
that ‘borders are largely beyond control and 
little can be done to really cut down on 
immigration’ (Bhagwati 2003). Other 
scholars have countered such scepticism by 
arguing that, on the whole, immigration 
policies have been largely effective 
(Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Carling 2002; 
Strikwerda1999). 
However, this is partly a spurious 
disagreement. Considerable conceptual 
confusion can be reduced by clearly 
distinguishing the preponderant role of states 
in migration processes from the 
comparatively more marginal role of specific 
immigration and emigration policies. There 
can be no doubt that states can play an 
absolutely crucial role in shaping and 
transforming migration patterns (Brochmann 
& Hammar 1999; Skeldon 1997; Strikwerda 
1999). Over the course of modern history, 
trends and patterns of migration have been 
intrinsically linked to processes of state 
formation and decline, economic and 
territorial imperialism and warfare. The very 
notion of international migration presumes 
the existence of national states and clearly 
defined territorial and institutional borders. 
The importance of factors such as economic 
and human development, labour markets, 
education and income inequalities points to 
the importance of non-migration policies, 
such as labour market, taxation, social 
welfare and foreign policies in indirectly 
affecting migration processes. From this, it is 
possible to hypothesize that state influence is 
primarily felt through general policies rather 
than migration policies per se, as the latter 
have a limited influence on the main 
determinants of migration. 
In the face of the dispute in migration 
research about the effectiveness of migration 
policy, it is important minimize conceptual 
confusion by clearly defining what 
constitutes migration policy and by 
distinguishing policy effectiveness from 
policy effects. Migration policies can be 
defined as laws, rules, measures, and 
practices implemented by national states with 
the stated objective to influence the volume, 
origin and internal composition of migration 
flows. The term ‘effectiveness’ refers to the 
extent to which policy objectives have been 
met, while the ‘effect’ just refers to the actual 
impact of a particular law, measure or 
regulation. This gives effectiveness a strong 
evaluative dimension. 
 
 
3.4 IMPACTS OF MIGRATION  
 
 
The migration policy literature has 
argued that immigration policies frequently 
fail because they have several unintended, 
often counter-productive effects. Within the 
framework developed in this paper, migrants’ 
agency – in particular their creative ability to 
defy immigration rules by adopting new 
migration strategies and pathways – plays a 
key role in explaining such unintended 
effects. However, the existence and strength 
of such ‘perverse’ effects is highly contested, 
and therefore requires better empirical 
testing. It is reasonable to assume that 
migration policies, if implemented, must 
have some effect on migration. The crucial 
questions are: which effects, and what is the 
relative importance of these effects compared 
to other migration determinants.  
Recent reviews of immigration policies 
lead to the hypothesis that policies are more 
effective in determining the selection and 
composition of migration rather than the 
overall volume and long-term trends of 
migration. However, the impact of policies 
on migration volumes of the particularly 
targeted category receive most if not all 
attention, which is unfortunate as the effects 
on other flows are crucial in understanding 
the structural and long-term effects of 
migration policies on overall migration 
flows. Based on the above analysis, I 
hypothesize that immigration restrictions can 
potentially lead to four main types of 
substitution effects which can reduce the 
effect of restrictions on inflows in the 
particular, targeted category: 
 Spatial substitution effects may 
occur through the diversion of migration to 
countries with less restrictive regulations for 
similar categories of migrants. There is some 
largely descriptive evidence observing such 
spatial substitution effects for asylum, family 
and irregular migration to Europe and North 
America. In the Dutch language, such spatial 
substitution effects have also been dubbed as 
the ‘waterbed effect’ (Grütters 2003; van der 
Erf 2003). 
 Categorical substitution effects may 
occur due to a reorientation towards other 
legal or illegal channels when entry through 
one particular channel becomes more 
difficult. For instance, it has frequently been 
argued that the lack of immigration channels 
for low-skilled labour migrants has 
compelled migration through family, asylum 
or student migration channels by people who 
basically migrated to work (Harris 2002; 
Massey 2004) and that it has increased 
irregular migration (Castles 2004b). 
 Inter-temporal substitution effects 
or ‘now or never migration’ may occur if 
migration surges in the expectation of a 
future tightening of migration regulations. 
For instance, it has been argued that when the 
Federal Republic of Germany tried to 
discourage family reunification in the late 
1970s, family migration to the Federal 
Republic increased, since many migrants 
feared that, eventually, family reunification 
might be forbidden completely (Entzinger 
1985). There was a surge in Surinamese 
migration to the Netherlands in the 1970s 
around independence, and a surge in West 
Indian migration before 1962, when 
restrictions were introduced with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Peach 
1968). Such effects have also been described 
for asylum migration (Grütters 2003). After 
the introduction of more restrictions, 
immigration typically shows a sharp fall. The 
long-term effect of such restrictions may thus 
be limited by the premeasure surge in 
inflows. 
 
 
 Reverse flow substitution effects 
occur when immigration restrictions decrease 
return migration flows. Several studies have 
argued that restrictive immigration policies 
discourage return migration and therefore 
push migrants into permanent settlement. 
This phenomenon has been described for 
Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ 
migration to north-west Europe, where many 
temporary workers ended up settling after the 
post 1973 recruitment ban (Böcker 1994; 
Entzinger 1985). If migration restrictions 
decrease inflows but simultaneously also 
decrease return flows, their effect on net 
inflows becomes much more ambiguous. 
However, such hypotheses have not been 
subjected to empirical tests. 
Above four hypotheses about the 
unintended effects of policy restrictions need 
to be taken into account when measuring the 
effect of particular policies on migration 
flows. Decreases in restrictiveness are likely 
to have the opposite effect, and restrictive 
emigration policies can also have more or 
less similar spatial, categorical, inter-
temporal and reverse flow substitution 
effects. As has been argued above, the danger 
of exclusively focusing on the particular 
inflow targeted by the policy is to over-
estimate its effect. It is only by focusing on 
the effects of policy on overall migration 
flows through other spatial and legal 
channels and over a longer time period that a 
more comprehensive and methodologically 
valid picture can be obtained. 
Additional hypotheses can be elaborated 
on the policy effects of frequently used 
nonrestrictive policy instruments. Examples 
may include the oft-assumed ‘pull effect’ of 
legalizations of irregular migrants, which 
have made such policies politically 
controversial. However, the existence of such 
pull effects has been contested based on 
descriptive quantitative analyses, indicating 
that this hypothesis needs proper testing. 
Another example is the effect of labour 
recruitment agreements. It has been argued 
that their effect is much lower than often 
hypothesized (Reniers 1999; Shadid 1979), 
but here also there is an absence of adequate, 
empirical tests. Besides measuring the direct 
effects of migration policies on the volume of 
flows within the migration category targeted 
by specific policies, empirical analyses 
within the determinants of migration project 
will focus on testing for these various 
substitution effects in order to acquire a more 
comprehensive empirical insight into the 
effects of migration policies. It goes without 
saying that empirical analyses will control for 
other theoretically relevant sending- and 
receiving-country migration determinants 
derived from the conceptual framework 
developed in this paper. 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the author have argued that 
although the effectiveness of migration 
policies has been widely contested in the face 
of their supposed failure to steer immigration 
and their hypothesized counter-productive 
effects, empirical evidence has remained 
inconclusive as a consequence of 
fundamental methodological and conceptual 
limitations. Although the general migration 
policy literature has yielded a rich set of 
hypotheses on possible policy effects, 
empirical evidence is mostly descriptive or 
anecdotal. At the same time, the migration 
determinants literature suffers from 
methodological problems and is largely 
based on obsolete and theoretically 
uninformed push-pull and gravity models, 
and is biased by omitting crucial sending-
 
 
country, non-economic and policy factors. 
The scholarly analysis of policy effects has 
remained under-theorized, and poorly 
connected to general migration theory. 
Because of this lack of precision and 
specification, it remains unclear how 
migration policies affect migration flows 
when other forces driving international 
migration are taken into account. Most 
empirical models miss out the ‘big picture’ 
by focusing on short-term fluctuations on 
particular migration flows and do not take 
into account the impact of policies on overall 
and long-term migration patterns and trends. 
More fundamentally, the contested nature of 
this debate reveals a still limited 
understanding of the forces driving 
international migration and the lack of 
theoretically driven research. Although there 
is consensus that macro-contextual economic 
and political factors and meso-level factors 
such as networks all play ‘some’ role, there is 
no agreement on their relative weight and 
mutual interaction. To start filling this gap, 
this paper outlined the contours of a 
conceptual framework for generating 
improved insights into the ways states and 
policies shape migration processes in their 
interaction with structural migration 
determinants in receiving and sending 
countries. 
This paper tried to argue that the current 
research impasse can only be overcome by 
firmly embedding the multi-method, 
longitudinal empirical analysis of policy 
effects into a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of the macro and meso-level 
forces driving international migration. The 
author have argued that the fragmented 
insights from different disciplinary theories 
can be integrated in one model through 
conceptualizing virtually all manifestations 
of migration as a function of capabilities and 
aspirations to migrate and also proposed a set 
of hypotheses on perverse ‘substitution 
effects’ of migration policies which can 
guide future empirical research. 
However, the limited ability of prior 
research to assess the role of states and 
policies and migration processes is not only 
linked to theoretical problems, but also to 
concomitant methodological problems and 
important limitations. Nevertheless, from this 
paper it may already be clear that, in order to 
be tested, the key hypotheses about potential 
substitution effects require particular data 
and methodological approaches. First of all, 
spatial substitution effects can only be 
studied through ‘double comparative’ 
approaches which simultaneously study the 
migration of multiple origin groups to and 
from multiple destination countries. Such 
double comparative analyses require the 
availability of bilateral flow data. Also for 
studying inter-temporal substitution effects, a 
key requirement is the availability of bilateral 
flow data which preferably spans several 
decades. The theoretical relevance of reverse 
flow substitution effects reveals the need to 
consider immigration and emigration as 
separate social phenomena which require 
aggregate and, preferably, bilateral migration 
data that differentiate between outflows and 
inflows. The study of categorical substitution 
effects requires migration flow data which 
differentiate between the different migrant 
categories. 
However, it is important to emphasize 
that not all problems can be ‘fixed’ just by 
collecting better data and specifying better 
quantitative models. Ultimately, empirical 
research should be theory- and not data-
driven, and the point is that many 
theoretically relevant structural factors are 
 
 
indeed difficult to quantify. There are serious 
limitations in the availability of reliable 
indicators and it would also be naïve to 
assume that such indicators can capture all 
relevant dimensions of such structural 
features. Empirical quantitative models 
should be improved as much as possible. 
However, this cannot solve all problems, and 
the ‘non-quantifiability’ of certain factors 
should not be a reason to ignore them. 
To combine the different strengths of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
methodological triangulation seems to be a 
more promising avenue. Such an approach 
systematically combines formal quantitative 
tests of key indicators using panel datasets 
with detailed case studies studying the 
relation between transformations of 
economic structures and labour markets and 
migration patterns for particular countries or 
regional blocks. Such case studies should 
provide an empirically ‘thick’, informed 
description, supplemented, whenever 
possible, with exploratory quantitative 
analysis. This can serve to develop new ideas 
and hypotheses as well as a ‘plausibility-
check’ of results generated by formal tests. 
Policy reviews should also include a 
qualitative assessment of the effects and 
effectiveness of these policies, from which 
hypotheses can be derived. Because much 
information on policies will be lost through 
quantification, the qualitative review and 
categorization of migration policies has a 
value in itself, and contributes to the 
improvement of the conceptual framework. 
Methodological heterodoxy and true 
interdisciplinary openness are therefore 
central conditions for advancing research on 
migration determinants. Through creatively 
integrating qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, it is possible to increase insights 
into the nature and evolution of migration 
policies and their effects on the size, 
direction, timing and composition of 
migration flows. Eventually, such an open, 
creative and flexible approach will enhance 
our ability to create a generalized theoretical 
understanding of the determinants of 
international migration.  
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